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WORKERS, INFORMATION, AND CORPORATE COMBINATIONS:
THE CASE FOR NON-BINDING EMPLOYEE REFERENDA
IN TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSACTIONS
Matthew T. Bodie*

This article proposes that employees be given a vote in nonbinding referenda
on mergers and other corporate combinations. The purpose of such referenda
would be twofold. First, they would provide more information to managers,
directors, and shareholders about the costs and benefits of the proposed
transaction. Second, they would give employees a voice in the process – a voice
that is valuable even if it has no material ramifications. Given the low costs in
implementing the referenda, the article encourages states to consider this
innovation as a small but significant addition to their corporate law schema.
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INTRODUCTION
How can I convey to you the disgust which your name awakens in me?
The merger with Warner was a catastrophe. But the hitherto
unimagined stupidity, the blind arrogance of your deal with Case
simply beggars description. How can you face yourself knowing how
much history, value and savings you have thrown away on your mad,
ignorant attempt to merge with a wretched dial-up ISP? I don’t know
what advice you have to offer, but I have some for you. Buy some rope,
go out the back, find a tree and hang yourself. If you had any honor you
would.
- email from Robert Hughes, Time magazine art critic, to Gerald Levin,
AOL Time Warner CEO, 20021

Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. On the one
hand, employees are central to every business. The success of a corporation
depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the frontline production or service worker. When we think of a corporation, we think of
its brand, its business, its leadership, and its employees. But for the most part,
corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. The players in corporate
law dramas are management, directors, and shareholders. The tension between
shareholders and management is the focal point of corporate scholarship.2
Employees have no role in corporate governance.
1

KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME WARNER
DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE 200 (2003).
2
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
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Perhaps nowhere is this contrast as dramatic as in the realm of mergers,
acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are
generally negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the
board, and then announced to great fanfare.3 Shareholders have the power to
vote on most large-scale combinations and therefore hold veto power over their
ultimate consummation.4 Employees have no say. Even unionized employees
do not have the right to bargain over these transactions; at most, they can
merely bargain about their effects.5
However, as the email in this article’s epigraph vividly demonstrates,
employees do have opinions about mergers, acquisitions, and other such
transformative corporate transactions. Some of these opinions may be fairly
predictable: for example, employees will be fearful of a merger that promises to
eliminate huge swaths of the company’s workforce. But employees also have
more nuanced opinions about their work environment – opinions based on
much more intimate knowledge about the company than shareholders typically
have.
These opinions may be overlooked in the post-announcement
excitement, especially since management has an interest in hearing only
positive news about the forthcoming combination.
This paper proposes that employees be given the right to vote on
mergers, sales of substantially all assets, and the other corporate combinations
for which shareholders can vote. Unlike shareholders’ ballots, the employees’
choices would not be binding on the company. The referenda would be held
before the required shareholders’ elections, so that shareholders could know
about the results before they cast their votes. Although it might be possible to
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (“We focus in this
paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the
owners and managers of the firm.”); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“Managerial
accountability to shareholders is corporate law’s central problem.”). Cf. Edward B. Rock &
Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001) (“It was as if everyone already knew (from
Berle and Means) that the master problem of corporate law was agency costs, and along came an
economic model and a vocabulary to elaborate that view.”).
3
In this description I refer only to transactions in which two companies combine; I do not include
hostile tender offers. Such offers may lead to shareholders’ selling their shares over the
objections of the target company’s board.
4
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2004).
5
Employers need not bargain over issues that are within the “core of entrepreneurial control.”
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (no duty to bargain over
decision to shut down part of business purely for economic reasons); International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 425
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (no duty to bargain regarding “sale” of manufacturer-owned and operated retail
outlets to franchisers). However, employers must bargain over the effects such actions have on
terms and conditions of employment. First National Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 676.
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implement the referenda through federal law, states could also enact the
referendum as part of their systems for corporate governance.
Why require corporations to conduct non-binding employee referenda?
First, the referenda will improve the information flow surrounding corporate
combinations and will lead to more efficient transactions. Mergers and
acquisitions are generally negotiated under a heavy shroud of secrecy by the
very top levels of management.6 After the initial agreement is announced,
management has a strong incentive to see that the merger is approved,
weakening any incentive for a robust debate on the merits of the plan. An
employee vote would provide concrete data about workers’ opinions on the
merger. Although the vote would not have any legal effect, directors,
management, and shareholders may find the expression of collective employee
wisdom to be useful in making their own determinations about the wisdom of
the proposed combination. Moreover, the vote would offer employees and
shareholders the opportunity to work together in furtherance of their mutual
interest: curtailing managerial rent-seeking.
Second, the vote will make employees feel more a part of the company
by giving them a voice in the process. Current corporate law doctrine treats
employees as a purchased input, no different than raw materials or property
expenses.7 The referendum will give employees a chance to express their
opinion on the combination. Social psychology research has shown that
employee voice leads to improved productivity and job satisfaction, as well as
greater corporate compliance.8 Allowing employees to participate in the
process creates a greater likelihood that employees will buy into the merger and
thus work for its success. In addition, the process of collective deliberation has
the potential to create social capital that will come into play in other societal
moments of democracy.
Finally, the proposed referenda impose relatively small costs on
companies. With improved technology, it is much easier and less expensive to
conduct a company-wide election than it once was.9 Rather than mailing proxy
materials to employees, employers will be able to make use of inter-office mail,
email, and corporate web pages to distribute the necessary materials and

6

See DAVID A. BROADWIN, NEGOTIATING AND DOCUMENTING BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 2 (1997)
(discussing the importance of confidentiality agreements to merger negotiations); J. Robert
Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing
Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 93 (1986) (“Most major arms length agreements are
preceded by a period of negotiations that typically take place behind a veil of secrecy.”).
7
Cf. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 60-66 (2006) (comparing the corporate
law protections for shareholders with the absence of such protections for employees).
8
Part III infra.
9
See Part IV infra.
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conduct the final tally. It is an ideal opportunity for state experimentation – the
“genius” of American corporate law.10
The barriers between corporate and labor law have too long stymied
efforts to provide employees with more involvement in their work life. Recent
studies have made clear that workers want some form of meaningful
participation in their place of employment.11 Traditional responses, such as
employee ownership, ESOPs, labor unions, and work councils, have failed thus
far to provide such opportunities to a large percentage of the workforce. The
implementation of these employee referenda would finally give workers a voice
on issues of corporate transformation, in an area where their input would
benefit managers, directors, and shareholders as well.
I. THE PROPOSAL
In the United States, corporations are creatures of state law.12 The
delegation of such a critical legal regime to a collection of fifty independent
governmental regimes has drawn both praise and criticism.13 What is perhaps
more remarkable, however, is the relative uniformity of corporate law despite
its many creators. In these different regimes, the central locus of authority
within the corporation is the board of directors.14 The board has the authority to
hire the officers of the corporation and to terminate the officers according to
contractual provisions. Although we generally think of the chief executive
officer as the head of the corporation, the board has the authority to remove the
CEO from office. In turn, the shareholders have the authority to elect the
board. This power structure has led to the conception that shareholders are the
ultimate “owners” of the corporation.15 However, directors have the right to
run the corporation largely as they wish and need not follow the dictates of a

10

ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
12
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 31 (2d ed. 2003).
13
See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 10 (praising the system); William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (criticizing it).
14
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
Means and Ends] (discussing how boards of directors control corporations). For an example of
the statutory provisions giving directors control, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141 (2007).
15
Current corporate scholars largely consider this conception to be a misconception. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604
(2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an
economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is
empirically incorrect.”).
11
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majority of shareholders on any particular issue.16 They are thus akin to
Burkean representatives: the elected representatives of their constituencies who
may govern largely according to their personal conscience.17
For certain fundamental corporate acts, however, directors need the
approval of a majority of shareholders. Amendments to the corporation’s
charter or article of incorporation must generally be approved by the Board and
by the shareholders.18 Shareholders must also consent to the voluntary
dissolution of the corporation.19 States have also generally required shareholder
approval for transactions that transform the institutional structure of the
corporation through a combination with another corporation. The standard
method of combination is the statutory merger.20 However, corporations also
de facto combine when one corporation buys the assets of the other corporation
or when a corporation buys the corporation’s shares through a tender offer. Not
all corporate combinations require shareholder approval. Mergers generally
require shareholder approval from the shareholders of both companies.21 In
Delaware, the state of incorporation for roughly fifty percent of the nation’s
public companies,22 mergers require approval from the shareholders of both
companies unless the company’s charter will remain unchanged post-merger
and less than twenty percent of the company’s outstanding common stock
would be involved in the merger.23 Shareholders must also approve a
corporation’s sale of “substantially all” of its assets.24 This language, which is
found in every jurisdiction, has been interpreted with some variation, but it
generally means the sale of a significant portion of the corporation’s assets in a
transaction outside of the corporation’s regular course of business.25
16

For an early expounding of this principle, see Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v.
Cunninghame, 2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906).
17
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 102-03 (2004) (describing directors as “vested with wide powers to exercise their
discretion by fiat”).
18
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2004).
19
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.01 (2004).
20
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2004).
21
See COX & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 609 (“Most states now provide for majority approval by
the shares entitled to vote . . . .”). Cox and Hazen note, however, that Massachusetts requires the
approval of two-thirds of the shareholders, and New York requires a two-thirds vote for
corporations created before 1989. See id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 46B(5) (Law. Coop 2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1986 supp. 2002).
22
The website for Delaware's Division of Corporations states that "[m]ore than half a million
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publiclytraded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500." Del. Dep't of State, Div. of Corps., Why Choose
Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml.
23
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c), (f) (2007).
24
Id. § 271(a).
25
COX & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 594-96.
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Why are shareholders given the right to veto these transforming
transactions? According to one commentator, the basic idea is that “sudden,
deliberate (that is, manager-initiated), major or ‘organic’ corporate changes that
affect shareholder interests ought to be approved or consented to by some
majority of the shareholders.”26 There seem to be two primary concerns here:
first, a concern about the drastic nature of the change, and second, a concern
that this change is initiated and controlled by management. With respect to the
nature of the change, corporate law wants to give shareholders the right to vote
down a proposal that would significantly alter the nature of the holdings in the
company. As residual claimants, shareholders are considered the most
“vulnerable” of the corporation’s stakeholders to management agency costs.27
Severe changes in the nature and scope of the enterprise will have more of a
direct effect on their rights than the rights of bondholders or employees. In
fact, mergers often force shareholders to exchange their stock for stock in
another company or in a newly formed company.28 Given the changes in their
contractual rights, shareholders have a strong interest in having some control
over the transformation of their company’s internal corporate structure.29
There is also a concern that transformative transactions offer an
opportunity for management to protect its own interests at the expense of the
shareholders.30 Corporate combinations offer an opportunity for executives to
receive a one-time monetary, stock, or stock option bonus based on the
fulfillment of the merger. When one company’s management will be replaced
or subordinated as a result of the transaction, the deal will often arrange for a
large payout to those managers as compensation for their loss of position.31
Conversely, executives of the newly-formed company may give themselves

26

ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 10.2.4 at 414 (1986).
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 1-39 (1991).
28
For example, in its merger with Alcatel, Lucent Technologies was absorbed into an Alcatel
subsidiary and ceased to exist. Former Lucent shareholders were given shares in the Alcatel
subsidiary. See Lucent Technologies Form 8-K, Form No. 01-116839, Nov. 20, 2006 (Item
3.01), available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006240/000089882206001443/fm8kdec6.txt.
29
More generally, former Delaware Chancellor Allen has described the shareholder franchise as
“the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del Ch. 1988).
30
The field of corporate law has largely centered around the general problem of management
opportunism. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 27; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 171 (1996).
31
For example, James Kilts, the former CEO of Gillette Company, received a package worth an
estimated $165 million as part of the merger of Gillette with Procter & Gamble. Gretchen
Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 56, 58 (magazine).
27
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bonuses for having successfully carried out the combination.32 Having the right
to veto a transaction gives shareholders power to vote down a transaction that
would reward management at the expense of the shareholders.33
This paper proposes an employee referendum for transformative
transactions which would piggyback on top of the existing system of
shareholder voting rights. Employees at a company involved in a combination
would be entitled to vote in a non-binding referendum on the combination
whenever shareholders also had the right to vote on the combination. All
employees would be entitled to cast a ballot. The referendum would be held
prior to the shareholders’ vote, with enough time for the results of the
referendum to be communicated to shareholders prior to their vote.34 Since the
referendum would not be binding on the corporation, the directors, or the
shareholders, victory or defeat would have no legal effect on the proposed
transaction. The percentage of employee votes for and against would be the
critical information communicated to the shareholders and (by extension) the
general public.
Further specifics are, of course, in order. The statute would need to
define who the corporation’s “employees” were for purposes of the vote. The
statute would also have to describe the timing and scope of the required
disclosure that would be made to shareholders. The statute could also set forth
what procedures would need to be followed for the vote, as well as whether
there were any remedies for improper procedures. These details, and the effect
they would have on the proposal, are discussed further in Part IV of the paper.
As a reference for what such a statute might look like, I have included a
proposed amendment to Delaware law in Appendix A.
The lack of any legal effect to the employee referenda may prompt an
initial concern that such a vote would be “meaningless.” The vote would, in
fact, have no legal effect on the outcome of the proposed transaction;
employees could vote overwhelmingly to reject a proposed merger only to see
it enacted through director and shareholder approval. Given the lack of legal
power behind the employee vote, what would be the point? The point is not to
create a regime of employee participation in governance, along the lines of the
German system of codetermination.35 Such a system would require real power
32

See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 127-30 (2004) (discussing bonuses paid for acquisitions).
33

Morgenson, supra note 31, at 58 (discussing how MONY shareholders threatened to vote
against a merger with AXA because of the high executive compensation to MONY executives).
34
Delaware requires notice to shareholders about the merger vote at least 20 days prior. SeE DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c) (2007). The employee referendum would need to be held early enough
so that the shareholder proxy materials could include the results of the referendum.
35
For a discussion of German codetermination, see Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
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sharing, whether through board participation, expanded union powers, or some
form of binding referenda. But this proposal is not a piece of that endeavor. In
fact, the objective of this proposal is to reap a portion of the benefits of
employee participation without some of the drawbacks and complications
codetermination engenders. With this in mind, I now turn to the reasons in
support of the proposed system of non-binding employee referenda: more
information, greater voice, and the low costs of experimentation.
II. REFERENDUM AS INFORMATION
As a non-binding resolution, the results of the employee referenda will
have no inherent legal power of their own. What the referenda will provide,
however, is information: information about whether the company’s employees
support or object to the corporate combination that has been proposed by
management. As discussed below, this information will be useful to those
groups who do have power over the transactions: shareholders and boards of
directors. This information will increase the likelihood that shareholders and
directors will reject inefficient transactions. As a result, management will do a
better job in carrying out these transactions from the start.
In order to understand what this information will convey and how it
will affect corporate decisionmaking, it is helpful to begin with a brief
description of both the purposes and the processes of mergers and acquisitions.
A. The Purpose of Corporate Combinations
It may seem overkill to spend time considering the purpose of a
corporate combination. Combining two companies is one of many possible
business decisions and thus should share the same rationale as the decision to
borrow money, hire employees, or purchase raw materials. Like any of these
decisions, the decision to combine with another company should rest on the
same principles behind the corporation itself. As is well known, however, the
purpose of the corporation itself has been the subject of prolonged, sustained
debate among corporate law scholars. Proceeding without considering this
debate risks a failure to establish first principles and, thereby, a failure to
establish the criteria upon which the employee referenda proposal is to be
judged.36
36

William Klein has recently criticized the failure of corporate law academics to establish such
first principles clearly. See William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 15 (2005) (“Academics debating various aspects of the law of business
associations are often like ships passing in the night. One reason for their inability to join issue
may be a failure to identify goals or objectives--the failure to weigh proposals against explicitly
stated criteria and to engage in effective cost-benefit analysis.”).
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Corporate law scholars generally employ a utilitarian approach, seeking
to maximize the overall gains to society through the corporate form. In
pursuing this end, the majority of corporate scholars ascribe to the notion of
“shareholder primacy,” or “shareholder wealth maximization.”37 The theory of
shareholder wealth maximization posits that by maximizing the returns to
shareholders above all other corporate goals, the corporation will also maximize
its contribution to societal efficiency.
This conception rests on the
shareholders’ role as the sole “residual claimants” within the corporation.
According to the theory, other actors within the corporation – creditors,
employees, customers, suppliers – have a relationship to the corporation that is
fairly well-defined through contract.38 However, shareholders’ returns are
residual; they are not payable until the other contractual participants had been
fully satisfied.39 In order to maximize social wealth, the corporation’s
organizing principle should be the maximization of the residual returns payable
to shareholders. In this way, all other claimants receive their contractual
entitlements, and shareholders’ remainder has been maximized.
On the other side of this debate stand those who argue for a
stakeholder-oriented conception of the corporation.40 According to stakeholder
theorists, the corporation’s purpose should focus on serving all of the
corporation’s stakeholders. In addition to shareholders, those with a stake in
the corporation include management, employees, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and even the broader community in which the corporation is
situated.41 Stakeholder theorists argue that a corporation and its directors
should focus on maximizing returns to all of these stakeholders. Although
commentators differ as to the means, most agree that directors should have a
significant degree of discretion in carrying out their duties so as to serve all of
these interests.42
Much of recent corporate law scholarship has taken up this debate
about the proper purpose of the corporation. Both sides hold strong opinions.
In 2001, one set of pro-shareholder-primacy commentators stated that “[t]here
37
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections,
55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 n.35 (2002) (“Today, most corporate law scholars embrace some
variant of shareholder primacy.”).
38
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 27, at 67-68.
39
Id. at 36-37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly-set contractual
entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift.
40
See Stout, supra note 15, at 1190 (citing William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of
the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1992)).
41
Stout, supra note 15, at 1190.
42
See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 118-19 (2001) (arguing that
boards of directors should be self-perpetuating); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280-81 (1999) (arguing for the notion
of directors as “mediating hierarchs” for the different constituencies at the firm).
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is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value,”43 while a
stakeholder theorist argued that the notion of stock price maximization is “as
destructive as it is simple.”44 However, it is also possible to make too much of
this distinction. In the long term, stock price maximization will depend on
keeping the other constituencies happy as well; cheating customers, employees,
or creditors will surely harm the company and by extension its stock price as
well. And stakeholder theorists have acknowledged that some focus on share
price can be a useful tool for constraining the discretion of management.45
Courts, as a whole, have not spent too much time on the debate themselves,
preferring to stick to the more practical concerns of fiduciary duties and
conflicts of interest.46
In this paper I sidestep this debate, arguing that non-binding employee
referenda would be beneficial under both shareholder primacy theory and
stakeholder theory. In other words, these referenda would improve overall
societal efficiency regardless of whether the best route to such efficiency is
shareholder wealth maximization or some version of stakeholder interests
maximization. As discussed further below, this dual approach rests primarily
on the role of the referenda in informing directors and shareholders,47 the role
of the referenda in restraining management,48 and the role of the referenda in
improving employee morale, productivity, and efficiency.49 All of these
benefits would lead to better results according to shareholder primacy as well as
stakeholder theory.50 Thus, for purposes of this paper, the purpose of corporate
combinations need only be the same purpose as the corporate form: namely,
increasing societal efficiency by maximizing returns to shareholders or
maximizing returns to all of the stakeholders in the company. Moreover, there
are reasons for concern that corporate combinations – as currently constructed –
are failing along both of these measures.

43

Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 439 (2001).
44
MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 4.
45
Stout, supra note 15, at 1200.
46
See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 22 J. CORP. L. 277, 280, 284-88 (1998)
(discussing how the concept of shareholder primacy has limited relevance to corporate law in
practice).
47
See Part II.D infra.
48
See Part II.D.3 infra.
49
See Part III infra.
50
What they do not support is a strong notion of managerial primacy, but concern about agency
costs has largely driven managerial primacy from the debate. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
Means and Ends, supra note 14, at 549 (noting that managerial primacy “no longer has much
traction in the legal academy”).
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B. Problems with Corporate Combinations
The initial challenge raised to employee referenda may be that their
absence under current law is a result of properly-made market decisions. If the
reform really increased firm efficiency, the argument goes, the market would
have already developed it.51 However, corporate combinations have been the
subject of extensive study in both law and finance literature, and there are
grounds for believing that such combinations decrease firm value. These
substantive concerns coincide with procedural concerns about incentives on the
part of executives, directors, and consultants to act inefficiently in their own
interest.
1. Substantive Problem: Poor Results. Corporate combinations can
often be scenes of shipwreck-level destruction for the companies involved.
Although some potential for failure is inherent in any enterprise, there is
evidence that corporate combinations may be generally value-reducing for the
participating firms. The effects of corporate combinations on firm value and on
stock price are much studied phenomena in the financial literature. The results
have been different for targets (smaller companies that will be taken over) as
compared with acquiring companies. There is general consensus that in the
very short term, when the corporate combination is announced, there are large
positive abnormal returns to companies that are the target of a proposed merger
or acquisition.52 While there is conflicting evidence on acquirers, the evidence
is sufficiently mixed that “the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance to
acquirers should not be rejected.”53 These results are attributable to the general
process whereby the acquirer offers to pay a premium over and above the
current market price for the target’s shares. Indeed, offers that are at or are
minimally above the current market price are generally rejected as nonserious.54 Thus, in the short term, gains from a merger announcement are often
51
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736-44 (2006) (criticizing Lucian Bebchuk’s programme of shareholder
empowerment because it has not already appeared in the marketplace). But see Michael D.
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779,
793-96 (2006) (discussing how learning and network externalities may impair efficient corporate
innovations).
52
Anup Agrawal & Jeffery E. Jaffe, The Post-merger Performance Puzzle, in ADVANCES IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7, 7 (Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory eds., 2000).
53
Id. (citing Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197
(1986)).
54
For example, Oracle was widely denounced for its initial bid to purchase PeopleSoft, which
offered little to no premium over market price. As one analyst stated, “If [Oracle is] serious,
they’re going to have to up their bid by a significant premium.” Andrew Ross Sorking & Laura
Flynn, Oracle Takes $5 Billion Jab at PeopleSoft, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003. at C1, C2. See also
Robin Sidel & David Bank, PeopleSoft Bid By Oracle Corp. Busts Tradition, WALL ST. J., June
10, 2003, at C1, C5 (noting that the Oracle bid “broke two longstanding traditions of deal
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zero sum, as the short-term boost to the target is offset by the loss to the
acquirer.
Over the long term, however, there are indications that corporate
combinations do not increase overall societal efficiency. Studies on long-term
returns for corporate acquisitions have generally shown “strong evidence of
abnormal under-performance following mergers.”55
There is empirical
evidence on both sides, and academics continue to refine and debate the best
methods for determining long-term performance.56 However, the overall
pattern has been one of value-reduction in the long term. Numerous academic,
financial, and media commentators have noted the failure of corporate
combinations to bring long-term gains.57
Furthermore, corporate combinations are more likely to fail in
situations where the employee referendum would take place – namely, where a
vote of the shareholders is required to execute the combination. As noted
earlier, shareholders must vote to approve most mergers, as well as the sale of
substantially all of their company’s assets.58 However, this leaves some large
swaths of corporate combinations uncovered. Most notably, shareholders do
not vote when the acquisition is through means of a tender offer. Instead,
shareholders “vote” for a tender offer by tendering their shares to the acquirer,
and the acquirer treats the purchase as a normal business transaction. This
contrasts with mergers between two companies in which the companies trade
stock to create a new corporation. Studies have demonstrated that companies

making: [m]ake an offer that carries a hefty premium to the target’s stock price and first approach
the target privately with a friendly bid”).
55
Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 52, at (50).
56
See, e.g., John D. Lyon et al., Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock
Returns, 52 J. FIN. 165 (1999).
57
See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES
14 (2005) (“The popular view is that M & A is a loser’s game.”); Robert G. Eccles et al., Are You
Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?, HARV. BUS. REV. 136, 136 (July-August 1999) (noting
“30 years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions do not create value for the acquiring
company’s shareholders”); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Evidence from
past merger waves shows that public companies engaging in mergers underperform their peer
companies that have not followed similar acquisition strategies.”); Sara Moeller et al., Firm Size
and the Gains from Acquisition, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201 (2004) (finding that takeovers by large
firms have destroyed $226 billion of shareholder wealth over 20 years); Morgenson, supra note
31, at 56 (“Academic research suggests that few mergers add up to significantly more prosperous
or successful companies . . . .”); Gregory Zuckerman, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST .J., Dec. 30,
2002, at C1 (“Most mergers don’t work . . . . A mountain of academic research shows most
acquisitions end up costing shareholders.”); “Why Most Big Deals Don’t Pay Off: A
BusinessWeek Analysis Shows that 61% of Buyers Destroyed Shareholder Wealth,” BUS. WEEK,
Oct. 14, 2002, at 60 (looking at 302 large mergers of public companies from 1995 to 2001).
58
See Part I supra.
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involved in stock-for-stock mergers fare more poorly than companies involved
in a cash transaction in which one company purchases the other.59
The information technology boom of the late 1990s is replete with
examples of failed corporate combinations. Perhaps the most notorious of all
corporate combinations is the merger between AOL and Time Warner. Known
as “the worst deal in history,”60 the combination laid waste to the market value
of the new company and led to the departure of almost all of the executives
responsible for the union.61 Three years after the completion of the merger,
shareholders in AOL Time Warner had lost over $200 billion in equity value.62
Although the company has stabilized under current leadership, its stock price
remains mired in place, and it recently was the subject of an aborted proxy
battle.63 The AOL-Time Warner merger has become the paradigmatic example
of a failed corporate combination.64
Other high profiles deals have been less spectacularly unsuccessful, but
unsuccessful nonetheless. In 2002 Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina pushed
through a merger with Compaq despite a proxy challenge from company
director Walter Hewlett, son of one of HP’s founders. The media heralded the
merger as a real victory for Fiorina, who succeeded despite litigation by
Hewlett alleging proxy improprieties.65 However, the merger failed to
revitalize HP, instead leading to Fiorina’s ouster in 2005.66 The merger’s
difficulties came despite a complex plan, lauded in the press, that was designed
to avoid the mistakes of past mergers.67 Other flawed combinations include the
merger of Mattel and The Learning Company,68 the merger of CUC
International and HFS (to form Cendant),69 and the merger between
59
See, e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 52, at (46) (noting that “abnormal performance is worse
for acquirers using stock-financing than for acquirers avoiding stock”); Carlos P. Maquierira et
al., Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers, 48 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 8 (1998) (noting that “research indicates that stock-for-stock mergers have
systematically lower offer premiums for target firm stockholders, significantly negative abnormal
returns for acquiring firm stockholders, and lower net synergistic gains created”).
60
SWISHER, supra note 1, at 9.
61
BRUNER, supra note 57, at 275-78.
62
NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL TIME
WARNER 277 (2004).
63
See, e.g., Ken Auletta, The Raid, NEW YORKER, March 20, 2006, at 132.
64
For a discussion of the AOL-Time Warner merger as an example of the dangers of the
shareholder primacy ethos, see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
65
See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2002 WL 818091 (April 30, 2002).
66
Paul R. La Monica, Carly Fiorina Forced Out at HP, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 10, 2005,
available at: http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/09/technology/hp_fiorina/index.htm?cnn=yes.
67
Pui-Wing Tam, An Elaborate Plan Forces H-P Union To Stay on Target, WALL. ST. J., April
28, 2003.
68
See BRUNER, supra note 57, at 246-64.
69
See Fanto, supra note 57, at 272-73.
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BankAmerica and NationsBank (forming Bank of America).70 Even those who
question whether corporate combinations have generally poor results concede
that a significant number of them have spectacularly poor results.71
Having found a strange pool of inefficiency in otherwise presumably
efficient markets, scholars have sought to figure out the reasons why. They
have identified the following flaws in the process as potential reasons for the
poor results.
2. Process Problem: Limited Information. The process of carrying out
a corporate combination generally follows a prescribed pattern. Initially, talks
are carried out at the highest levels of the corporation over the feasibility and
desirability of a combination. If the top officers agree to a deal, then the
companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence using highlevel management and outside consultants. If this hastily-conducted due
diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and the
deal is announced to the public and the shareholders. The shareholders
generally have a few months to digest the proxy materials and media reports
before they vote to approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into
effect.
There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process. Executives
begin in secrecy because news of negotiations can send stock prices up.72
Competitors may also jump into the process if word gets out, making the
negotiations more complicated and costly.73 Failed merger negotiations can
damage both companies’ reputations, or make one company seem weak and
ripe for the taking. The ramifications of such negotiations are so far-reaching
that executives do their best to keep the discussions under tight wraps. They
may be so secret that only a handful of the company’s top executives even
know about them.74
While this secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the
information and the perspectives that can be brought to bear. The decision to
actually carry out the merger is generally made at the very highest levels before
any due diligence. For example, in the AOL – Time Warner merger, Case and
Levin made the decision to merge the two companies at a dinner in a private

70

See id. at 274.
See BRUNER, supra note 57, at 95-340 (discussing particularly poor performers).
72
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the importance of
keeping merger negotiations secret).
73
See Brown, supra note 6, at 93 (“Corporate officials fear that premature disclosure may result
in a competitive disadvantage or may jeopardize continuation of the negotiations.”).
74
See MUNK, supra note 62, at 141-43 (discussing how AOL CEO Steve Case and Time Warner
CEO Gerald Levin met in secrecy at hotels and homes to carry out their talks).
71
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room at the Rihga Royal Hotel.75 For the next two months, small groups of
executives and advisors on both sides haggled over the final details, such as the
number of board seats each side would have in the new company, and the
values of shares given to each set of shareholders.76 The negotiations were
intense, and the transaction was called off at various points. Ultimately, Levin
and Case made the final agreement over dinner with only two other executives
present.77 Only four executives at Time Warner knew about the possibility of a
merger before the agreement had been reached.78
While Levin may have been unusually secretive with his upper-level
cohorts, the general rule for merger negotiations is a shroud of secrecy
maintained by a small number of executives and advisors.79 As a result,
corporate combinations are extremely top-down affairs. The critical decision to
combine is made at the very top, often by the CEO alone. Only after the
decision to combine has been made are larger circles of executives and advisors
included in the planning.
As a result, the board and the shareholders are often handed something
of a fait accompli. Presumably the board has the benefit of due diligence
conducted by investment banks which is designed to draw out any potential
flaws in the merger.80 But those conducting the due diligence know the end
result they are supposed to come to – allowing the combination to proceed.
Due diligence is generally conducted by the same investment banks who have
75

See MUNK, supra note 62, at 143 (“By the end of the evening, Levin and Case were of one
mind. Together they could create the world’s most powerful and respected Internet-driven media
and entertainment company.”).
76
Id. at 145-56.
77
Also present were Kenneth Novack, AOL’s vice chairman, and Richard Bressler, the head of
Time Warner Digital Media. Id. at 156.
78
Id. at 158 (noting that only Bressler, Rob Marcus (who worked under Bressler), then-president
Richard Parsons, and deputy general counsel Chris Bogart had heard of the negotiations). The
chief financial officer and the general counsel had no knowledge of the negotiations. Id. at 15960.
79
See, e.g., BILL VLASIC AND BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ
DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 227 (2000) (“Only ten executives in Chrysler knew of the pending
deal, and only a few more than that at Daimler.”); Press Release, Walter Hewlett Responds to
Statement
from
Hewlett-Packard,
Feb.
19,
2002,
available
at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000089161802000839/f77503i1dfan14a.htm
(“According to [Hewlett-Packard] management’s own earlier claims, the Compaq merger [with
Hewlett-Packard] is the culmination of a surprise telephone conversation between [HewlettPackard CEO] Carly Fiorina and [Compaq CEO] Michael Capellas which occurred only a few
short months before the merger was announced.”).
80
See,
e.g.,
Goldman
Sachs,
Investment
Banking,
available
at:
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/client_services/investment_banking/index.html;
Robert
J.
Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96
YALE L.J. 119, 121-25 (1986). For a narrative example of the role of financial advisors in a
merger, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2001 WL 21003437, at *8-*12 (Del.Ch.,2003).
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been working with the firms’ principals; these banks stand to earn fees if the
combination proceeds.81 Moreover, they are often given incredibly short
periods of time in which to conduct the diligence. For the AOL Time Warner
merger, the largest combination in history, the banks were given three days
over a weekend to prepare their fairness reports for the companies’ boards.82
The board has the final approval of the deal before it is announced as a
deal to the media. As the situs of corporate power,83 the board might be
considered the driver behind any corporate combination. However, in reality
the board is at best a check against top executives; at worst, the board is simply
a rubber stamp to management’s decisions. Much has been written about the
role of the board in the modern corporation, and recent corporate governance
reforms have focused on strengthening the board’s ability to monitor
management.84 But boards are made up of top management or part-timers. The
part-timers may or may not be independent; so-called independent directors
often have a powerful tie or obligation to management.85 In any event, they are
part-timers, generally with significant responsibilities of their own to another
firm.86 As a result, it is difficult for directors to obtain and digest the
information necessary to monitor management with any degree of intensity.
These monitoring weaknesses are exacerbated by the limited timeframe
for the board’s decision. Management generally informs board members about

81

MUNK, supra note 62, at 166 (noting that the two investment banking firms involved in the
AOL Time Warner merger each received a fee of $60 million); Giuffra, supra note 80, at 127-28
(noting that “investment banks face strong incentives to provide opinions that serve
management's interests”).
82
MUNK, supra note 62, at 161-62. As one of the bankers involved in the opinions noted, “If you
do a deal over a weekend, you take shortcuts. In hindsight, it was sloppy.” Id. at 163.
83
See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 14.
84
Commentary on the board’s role in monitoring management has been voluminous. The
discussion stems from the focus placed on managerial agency costs. See Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 2. Many commentators have seen the board’s primary role as reducing these costs
through monitoring. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 205-09 (1976) (discussing board structure to maximize monitoring). The failures of
the boards at Enron, WorldCom, and other failed companies has led to a reexamination of the
board as monitor. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate
Perfromance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 356 (2004).
85
See, e.g., In re Oracle Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that
directors, who were professors at Stanford University, lacked independence as to defendant
executives, who had promised substantial charitable gifts to the university). For recent work on
the function of independent directors, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465 (2007), and Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513.
86
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 31-37.

EMPLOYEE REFERENDA

18

the potential deal at the last minute in order to maintain secrecy.87 Directors get
their information about the deal from the bank’s fairness opinion, which has
been drafted with the purpose of convincing the board to do the deal. The
board then has an extremely limited amount of time to decide on whether to do
the deal. The process is not designed to provide board members with a true
informational picture of the combination. It is instead designed to get the
board’s approval at the last minute, as a prelude to the formal announcement.88
The announcement itself shows the front-loaded nature of the process.
When the principals call a press conference to announce the combination, the
deal appears to the public to be complete.89 The announcement is not framed as
one step in a process of approval, but rather as the announcement of the actual
deal, pending a few technicalities. The announcement has the air of a
celebration, and the media often joins in on the fun.90
In contrast to the board, shareholders are given significantly more time
to make their decision concerning the merger and can look to the required
proxy disclosure about the merger. Depending on the size of the merger, the
media may also be a source of information. But again, the process is designed
not to give shareholders an active role in the combination, but rather to secure
their “yes” vote with as little controversy as possible. State law as well as
federal securities regulations require substantial disclosure when public
companies solicit proxies.91 The materials tend to be quite lengthy.92 While the
87

The need to keep merger negotiations secret was at the heart of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988). The court ruled that executives were not free to lie about their negotiations,
despite the need for secrecy. Id. at 236. The court reasoned that a consistent “no-comment”
policy would protect the secrecy of the negotiations without misleading investors. Id. at 239
n.17. But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069-71 (1990) (arguing
that secrecy is critical to the M & A market and arguing that lying should be permitted in that
context).
88
See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 62, at 170-74 (discussing the Time Warner board’s approval of the
merger with AOL).
89
For a recent example of premature closure, see Whole Foods is Buying Wild Oats, ASSOC.
PRESS, Feb. 21, 2007 (“Whole Foods Market Inc. said Wednesday it will pay $565 million for
Wild Oats Markets Inc., a chain of natural and organic food markets in the United States and
Canada.”); Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Buys Smaller Rival, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007 (web
version). The Times changed the title in time for the print version. Andrew Martin, Whole
Foods Makes Offer for a Smaller Rival, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1.
90
See Fanto, supra note 57, at 298 (“[T]he media has celebrated [mega-merger] transactions and
lionized the CEOs proposing them . . . .”).
91
State law generally requires that corporations have a duty to disclose the facts material to their
stockholders' decisions to vote on a merger. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp.,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del.1994). The test is generally stated as follows: “An omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote.... Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
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required disclosure is designed to provide shareholders with critical
information, firms and their counsel generally design such disclosure in order to
minimize risk of after-the-fact liability for improper disclosure.93 As a result,
the disclosure tends to be a static, lump-sum document which is written
primarily to advance the proposal while meeting legal requirements.
In some circumstances, particularly for larger combinations, the media
does serve a role in investigating the proposal and serving as a check against
management. However, business journalists generally need some sort of hook
in order to generate interesting coverage. Most shareholder votes are dull
affairs for the media, with the proposal receiving the overwhelming majority of
votes.94 The only recent shareholder vote on a corporate combination that drew
any press was the vote for the Hewlett-Packard and Compaq merger. That vote
drew attention because of Walter Hewlett’s battle against the merger and
subsequent litigation over the proxy contest.95 Even those combinations that
draw a significant amount of attention may not receive the appropriate
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d
773, 778-79 (Del.1993) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96
S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)). In Delaware, two recent cases by Vice Chancellor Leo
Strine, Jr. have highlighted the company’s disclosure obligation to shareholders. The vice
chancellor enjoined a shareholder’s vote in In re Lear Corp Shareholders Litigation, 926 A.2d 94
(Del. Ch. 2007) because the company had failed to disclose the CEO’s financial situation that
made a buyout personally favorable to him. See id. at 98 (concluding that shareholders were
“entitled to know that the CEO harbored material economic motivations that differed from their
own that could have influenced his negotiating posture”). In In re Topps Co. Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007), Vice Chancellor Strine held that the company had failed
to disclose several critical factors to shareholders about its proposed merger, such as the
willingness of the acquirer to retain current management and the seriousness of a competing bid.
In both cases, the shareholders vote was enjoined until shareholders received the appropriate
disclosures.
Federal securities regulations provide for more uniform disclosure through § 14 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006). Specific disclosures are provided for in
the regulations. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240-14a-3, §240-14a-101 (Schedule 14A) (2007).
92
For example, the proxy solicitation materials regarding the proposed Lucent-Alcatel merger are
175 pages plus 75 pages of appendices. See Lucent-Alcatel Merger Proxy Statement, August 4,
2006.
93
Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 146 (2006)
(noting that companies base disclosure decisions on liability concerns).
94
Shawn Tully, Taking the Guesswork Out of Proxy Voting, CNNMoney.com, December 21,
2006,
available
at:
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/12/25/8396763/index.htm (noting that “most of the deals win shareholder approval by an
overwhelming margin”).
95
See, e.g., Dawn Kawamoto, Walter Hewlett Speaks Out, CNET News, at:
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-858499.html. Hewlett hired consulting firms, made numerous
presentations, and took out several ads all with the purpose of persuading shareholders to vote no.
It is estimated that both sides combined spent over $100 million in their efforts to persuade
shareholders. Michael Brick & Steve Lohr, Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy
Battle, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2002.
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journalistic scrutiny; the press has been largely adulatory of the CEOs who can
bring off a high-stakes merger.96
Thus, from start to finish the typical corporate combination is hampered
by the absence of critical information. At the beginning, the CEO and her
trusted coterie must labor in secret in developing the basic decision on whether
or not to combine. Once the CEO has decided to go forward, the board
generally approves the combination under hurried conditions with information
provided by those who are already invested in the deal – the CEO, her advisors,
and an investment bank that stands to earn hefty fees if the deal goes through.
Then, shareholders vote after receiving a thoroughly vetted, lengthy disclosure
document and perhaps hearing some media scrutiny. By that point, however,
the company itself has committed to the combination. Given this process, there
is real reason to question whether the information used in making the decision
is optimal.
3. Process Problem: Managerial Overconfidence. Limited information
is not the only obstacle to efficiently negotiated corporate combinations.
Within the negotiations themselves, commentators have long been concerned
that top executives may not be negotiating with economic rationality. Instead,
there is a concern that CEOs may be acting with hubris – an inflated sense of
their own abilities and the transactions they seek to effectuate.97 This hubris
may be a product of two types of systematic irrationalities known as heuristics
– the optimism bias and the commitment bias. These two heuristics form what
one commentator has labeled the optimism-commitment “whipsaw.”98

96

See Fanto, supra note 57, at 298-304. Even proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) have been strangely acquiescent towards many of the ill-founded mergers of
recent past. See Tully, supra note 94 (“M&A is ISS's weak point. It has a long record of
recommending deals that were doomed from conception, and it has consistently endorsed
mergers in which the buyer agreed to vastly overpay.”).
97
Richard Roll has argued that corporate takeovers were generally a value-neutral proposition,
and that therefore rational executives would not seek them out. Roll, supra note RR1, at 198 (“It
will be argued here that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.”). In
order to explain the frequency of combinations, Roll relied not on rational market theory, but
rather managerial hubris. Id. at 200. Relying on the empirical evidence that individual
decisionmaking is not always rational, Roll noted that takeovers were an apt subject for such
research, since takeovers reflect individual decisions. Id. at 199. Given that the data, in his view,
did not show added value from takeovers to the acquiring firm, Roll hypothesized that managerial
hubris – namely, the notion that their (higher) valuation of the target was better than the market’s
(lower) valuation – was responsible for takeover activity. Id.
98
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions].
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Scholars have keyed in on the effects of the optimism or overconfidence bias on high-level corporate decisionmakers.99 The optimism bias is
one of the most well-chronicled and intuitively-resonant biases.100 The bias
refers to people’s irrational beliefs that they are smarter, more successful, and
more talented than they actually are. The quintessential optimism bias study
concerns questions about whether one’s ability in a certain area is “above
average.” Subjects on average believe that their talents are above average.101
Relatedly, evidence also suggests that individuals underestimate others’
abilities, especially those of their competitors.102 Optimism bias also leads
individuals to believe that good things are more likely to happen to them, and
bad things are less likely to happen to them, than they are to other people.103
Another component of the optimism bias is the so-called “illusion of control.”
This irrationality means that “people not only think that they are better than

99

See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39 (3d ed.
1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers).
100
See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in Markets
and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 385-410 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“Perhaps the most
robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”).
101
See David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (finding that seventy
percent of high school students in one study rated themselves above average in leadership skills,
while only two percent ranked themselves below average on that dimension); Ola Svenson, Are
We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146
(1981) (finding that most drivers believe they are above average drivers); D. Walton, Examining
the Self-Enhancement Bias: Professional Truck Drivers’ Perceptions of Speed, Safety, Skill and
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called the “Lake Wobegon Effect.” See The Lake Wobegon Effect, Wikipedia, available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Wobegon_effect.
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average when skill or ability is relevant to outcomes, they sometimes believe
that they have more control over outcomes than they do.”104
Although the optimism bias creates an irrational perspective, social
psychologists believe the bias may be rationally adaptive.105 A bias towards
optimism gives the individual a reason to strive to overcome difficulties. It
may inspire others to similarly persist. The illusion of control may lead
individuals to try harder to succeed, since they have the “illusion” that success
is within their grasp. In fact, many believe that corporate executives are wellserved by these very traits.106 The tournaments which drive the market for
managerial talent reinforce optimism and the illusion of control by giving those
with such biases a greater likelihood of success.107
However, those same irrationalities that allow CEOs to climb the
corporate ladder successfully also may work against the company’s fortunes
when applied to business decisions. And in fact, research has shown that
executive overconfidence has demonstrated effects on corporate
decisionmaking. According to the research, executive overconfidence leads to
excessive entry into unfamiliar markets,108 overpaying in the context of
auctions,109 an overreliance on the executive’s personal information and
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perspective,110 and a belief that the market is undervaluing the executive’s own
company.111 As a result, executive overconfidence may lead to a consistent
pattern of market irrationality, resulting in inefficiencies.
Furthermore, overconfidence can combine with another behavioral
heuristic to do even more damage to corporate decisionmaking.112 Social
psychologists have identified a human tendency to stay with a project or
endeavor past when it remains profitable or beneficial to do so. This reluctance
to abandon prior sunk costs is known as the commitment bias.113 Studies have
demonstrated this bias within the corporate world.114 When commitment bias
teams up with the optimism bias, executives will not only make overly
optimistic choices, but they will also stay with those choices long after the
evidence should show them the error of their ways – the aforementioned
“optimism-commitment whipsaw.”115
The exacerbated effects of these
irrationalities may lead to unethical behavior, as executives realize too late how
bad the situation is and desperately try to get themselves out of it.116
It is easy to see how these biases may lead to poor decisionmaking in
the context of corporate combinations. At the beginning of negotiations, the
CEO and just a few trusted advisors are put in the position of determining
whether the combination makes sense, and on what terms.117 The success of
the combination, in the eyes of the CEO, may largely depend on his or her own
finesse and ability in making the transaction work. The overconfidence bias is
thus likely to make the CEO more likely to believe that he or she can make the
combination a success. Once the two sides agree to the transaction, the
commitment bias takes over. Even though only the CEO and a small group of
executives have decided on the combination, in their minds the commitment
has been made. Thus, they are prone to push hard for the deal and genuinely (if
even irrationally) believe that the deal will make the corporation better off. The
commitment bias will then affect the board’s judgment once it has decided in
110
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favor of the transaction. These players are thus more likely to stick with their
decision even if further evidence changes the cost-benefit analysis that a biasfree actor would make.
As noted earlier, scholars have particularly noted the presence of
management overconfidence and hubris in the market for corporate control.118
Unlike other areas of corporate conduct, the finance literature has made a place
for behavioral irrationalities such as overconfidence in large-scale mergers and
acquisitions. These irrationalities place a further burden on the combination
process.
4. Process Problem: Managerial Financial Incentives. In additional to
irrational biases in favor of the combination, managers and directors will often
have quite rational biases in favor of executing the deal. Because combinations
are a time of upheaval and reorganization, they are also a time to revisit the
positions and compensations of the executives and directors who run each
company. It should not be surprising that companies often make large payouts
at these times – payouts that may not be justified under an arms-length system
of compensation negotiation.
The payments come on all sides and for all different reasons. When a
small company is being merged into a bigger company, the so-called “target”
company will often pay its departing executives a sizeable sum.119 This
payment is justified as compensation for a loss or downgrade of position, and it
may be necessary to move a profitable combination forward. But it also means
that these managers and directors can exact a price for their acquiescence to the
plan – a premium unavailable to most employees. And that premium may be
excessive, and against shareholder interests. Sometimes this payment is made
by the target company itself, while in other cases the acquiring company pays
the sum. In both cases, there is concern that the executive will become too
attached to the payout and will fail to follow shareholder interests.120
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Companies also give executive bonuses when they are on the acquiring
end of the deal. According to one study, the acquiring company’s CEO
received a gratuitous multimillion-dollar bonus in about 40 percent of
acquisitions.121 The bonuses are often given as cash for work that falls within
the overall job expectations of a chief executive officer. Acquisition bonuses
are a critical example of the “managerial power” thesis: these bonuses are not
the result of compensation negotiations but rather the CEO’s power over the
board.122 In addition, they provide a powerful incentive for executives to
pursue acquisitions. Another recent study has found that executives’ decisions
to expand company size are associated with increases in subsequent pay.123
There is a real concern that “the promise – or even the expectation – of an
acquisition bonus could exacerbate managers’ excessive acquisition
tendencies.”124
In addition, shareholders may not know ahead of time whether the
board will view the merger and its implementation as a justification for a
substantial bonus after the merger has been approved. In his campaign against
the Hewlett-Packard merger with Compaq, renegade director Walter Hewlett
raised this issue explicitly. In a report distributed as part of his campaign,
Hewlett accused the company of “hiding the ball” with respect to post-merger
compensation.125 Because he believed that management was not forthcoming,
he leaked board discussions that had contemplated compensation packages
totaling more than $115 million.126 It is, of course, highly unusual to have a
dissident board member leak such information; shareholders are generally not
privy to such understandings or discussions.
Given the propensity for managers to use combinations as a reason for
higher pay, it is no wonder corporate combinations themselves have come
under greater scrutiny.127 Even if such bonuses are based on desert, they still
can provide a powerful incentive to initiate or continue with deals that should
not be done.
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5. Process Problem: Deal Protection Provisions. In addition to the
information and behavioral problems that can lead to bad corporate
combinations, many firms find themselves locked into a decision not only by
the commitment bias, but also by contractual provisions. Deal protection
provisions include agreements to sell certain assets to the bidding company at a
reduced price if the transaction does not go through; agreements to submit the
transaction to the shareholders, even if the board changes its mind; termination
fees if the transaction does not occur; and side agreements with key
shareholders as to their votes. Such provisions have been the subject of
considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion for their role in
discouraging hostile takeovers.128
There is substantial literature in support of deal-protection provisions:
such provisions protect the initial bidder and may increase the likelihood that
bidders will enter into combination agreements in the first place.129 However,
such provisions also extract a price: they make it much more difficult for
boards and shareholders to get out of a deal after the fact. In fact, deal
protection provisions are often written to provide protection to the disappointed
firm even if the shareholders reject the proposed combination.130 Certainly deal
protection provisions offer an opportunity for managers and directors to make it
more painful for shareholders to reject a proposed merger. The costs of such
proposals have led some commentators to recommend more judicial skepticism
of such provisions.131
C. The Employee Referendum as Information Generator
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An overview of the corporate combination process reveals problematic
tendencies toward inefficient behavior.
The combination begins with
discussions between a small group of executives at the highest level, who are
by necessity acting on limited information. They soon become locked into the
deal, however, and the other participants in the process – namely, the directors
and the shareholders – often play a purely reactionary role. The process would
become more efficient with more information, particularly information from
players who are not tied into the success of the combination.
Employees are a natural fit for this role. In the 1980s and 1990s both
academic and popular business literature discussed the ways in which firms
could take better advantage of the information held by employees.132 The
success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate ways in which Japanese
firms sought to work with employees to better design the business.133 Groups
such as “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams” were heralded as a
way of getting workers to contribute their knowledge to the corporation.134
Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and
the Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the
information and disseminated down the ladder.135
The employee referendum would be one way of tapping into this
employee knowledge base. The referendum would ask employees whether they
thought the proposed merger should go through. The results of the referendum
itself – the percentage voting for, the percentage voting against – would be
useful information. Beyond that, however, those results would in turn lead to
efforts to explain the results. These explanatory efforts would generate more
information about the merger and its wisdom.
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At first glance, the results of the referendum itself may not seem all that
important. After all, it is a non-binding referendum that simply says whether
the employees believe the merger is a worthwhile endeavor. Much of this
information, it could be argued, is accessible simply by asking the employees.
However, although managers may be able to get a general sense of employee
sentiment through internal channels, that anecdotal information is not the same
as a referendum. Anecdotal information may be insightful, but it may also vary
wildly from the actual reality. Managers cannot be expected to contact every
employee about their thoughts on the combination.136 Given the lack of
unionization among private sector employees, most companies will not have
union representatives that they can turn to as barometers of employee
sentiment.137 In addition, managers will be primed to read employee sentiment
as supporting the merger, since they have already bought into it. Psychological
biases will lead managers to overvalue employee support and undervalue
employee criticism.138 In addition, employees will be more likely to publicly
support the combination, whatever their own views, if they think managers are
looking for positive feedback.139 Employees might be fearful that failure to
support the combination will be punished. Finally, even if managers could get
a realistic read on employee sentiment, they will in all likelihood keep that
information to themselves. They are unlikely to share the information with
directors, the shareholders, or the public, particularly if employees are generally
unfavorable about the transaction.
The difficulties in determining employee sentiment without a
referendum were highlighted in the recent proxy battle over the HewlettPackard (H-P) merger with Compaq. Both sides in that battle claimed that
employees agreed with their position. In fact, H-P shareholder and merger
opponent David W. Packard commissioned independent polls of employees on
the merger.140 The polls were conducted by surveying residents in three towns
that were known to have high concentrations of H-P employees.141 The results
showed that employees surveyed (which included retirees) were against the
136
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merger by a 2-to-1 ratio.142 However, Hewlett-Packard claimed that it had
internal survey data demonstrating that more than sixty percent of employees
were in favor of the merger.143 Both sides attacked the other’s data.144 In both
cases, however, the results reflected surveys of small portions of employees –
not comprehensive efforts to determine what employees thought as a collective
whole.
In addition to providing a definitive, quantitative account of employee
sentiment, the referendum will then generate a second level of information:
reporting on the referendum’s results and the reasons behind those results.
Once the votes are counted, the results will trigger a discussion about the
meaning behind the numbers. They will provide for a more grounded dialogue
amongst employees, managers, directors, and shareholders. Moreover, instead
of merely relying on anecdotal accounts from individual employees, members
of the press will have a concrete figure to discuss and dissect. They can then
look to the company, employees, and analysts for explanations of the result.
Much of this information will still be anecdotal, but it will be in response to a
firm-wide survey of employees. It will be grounded in a more scientific slice of
reality.145 This second level of information generation will add an important
layer of context to the raw numbers.
Having identified the type of information that the referendum will
generate, we are still left with determining the usefulness of this information.
What does a vote for or against the combination say about that combination?
What are the reasons behind it? An employee’s vote can likely be explained by
three different general areas of concerns: business judgment concerns,
employee-related concerns, and managerial opportunism concerns. Some
employees may vote based solely on one of these reasons, while others may
cast their vote based on all three. Each category will have different benefits and
uses for management, directors, and shareholders. But this is the type of
information that is likely to bubble up in the referendum’s wake.
142
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1. Business-Judgment Concerns. Business judgment concerns reflect a
judgment on the part of employees about the business sense of the combination.
This judgment may be reflected in majority support for the combination, which
would signal agreement with the managers’ business judgment, or it may be
reflected in majority disapproval of the combination, which would sign
disagreement with the managers’ judgment. Employees may agree or disagree
with managers on a variety of business-related judgments: the culture of the
other firm, the value of the other firm’s business or technology, the need for a
combination to expand the business or enter new markets. A vote that centered
on these concerns would generate further information about these businessrelated issues.
Information generated in this category is obviously useful to all three
groups of decision-makers: managers, directors, and shareholders. Managers
will benefit by getting feedback on their planned combination. They may
choose to abandon the plan if employees raise significant enough concerns, or
employee support may bolster their confidence in the plan. Even if they
disagree with the employees’ judgment, knowing those concerns will make it
easier for management to adapt the plan so that, down the road, employees buy
into the new arrangement. Employee participation in and adaptation to the
combination are perhaps the most important factor in achieving a successful
new company.146
Directors would benefit from the information in their role as stewards
of the transaction and the firm. Although directors will have approved of the
merger before the referendum, they maintain the ability to withdraw the
combination from consideration by the shareholders or to recommend a “no”
vote to the shareholders. Some merger agreements contain a “fiduciary out”
clause, in which the board is given the right to withdraw from the agreement if
their fiduciary duties as directors require the deal to be nixed.147 If employee
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referenda are implemented, perhaps directors will stipulate that employee
disapproval gives a board the discretion to terminate the agreement.148 An
employee vote disapproving the deal, together with the information supporting
that vote, may be sufficient to change a board’s mind about the wisdom of the
transaction.
Finally, shareholders might also look to the employees’ business
judgment in casting their vote about the proposed combination. For reasons
discussed above, management and directors might not give the proper weight to
negative information generated by the employee referendum about the deal’s
business impact.149 Executives and the board will have already formulated and
executed the deal and are then looking for shareholders to go along with the
plan. Their buy-in, combined with behavioral heuristics, may lead them to
irrationally ignore or discount business judgment concerns generated from
employees. Shareholders, however, will not be subject to these irrationalities
and thus could vote against the plan based on the employees’ business
judgment concerns.
Indeed, in the most hotly contested merger proxy contest in recent
memory, both sides looked to employees to bolster their claims about the
wisdom of the proposed transaction. In the battle over the Hewlett-Packard
merger with Compaq, both management and the dissident group argued that
employees agreed with their position. In presentations and advertising, Walter
Hewlett emphasized that H-P employees were against the merger; one
advertisement stated, “If employees are opposed to the Compaq merger at a rate
of almost 2 to 1, what hope is there for the Compaq merger?”150 In addition,
both the dissident group and David Packard quoted employee responses
discussing the merits of the merger proposal.151
Even if these scenarios are possible, one might question whether
employees would actually have the business judgment necessary to detect and
then vote against a proposed deal based simply on the merits. Firms generally
do not call upon the combined judgment of employees in making business
decisions; instead, executives are hired to make these big-picture decisions
using their access to both public and confidential sources of information along
with their intelligence and experience. The likelihood is slim to none, it might
be argued, that employees as a whole would actually exercise better business
replaces previous factual, case-by-case analysis, may suggest that contracts will require some
form of fiduciary out to pass muster in the future.”).
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Of course, canceling the deal would likely result in a termination fee, but agreements
generally require such fees even if shareholders vote down the proposed combination.
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judgment on a deal than management and the cadre of professionals who advise
them.
However, this conventional wisdom about employees’ judgment may
be overstated and, in fact, misplaced. As discussed earlier, firms are now using
methods to draw more and more information from their employees.152 Much of
this activity is focused on the lower level, such as the shop floor.153 However,
employees may also have collective wisdom on big-picture items as well. In
The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki argues that firms should tap
employees not only for bottom-level productivity concerns, but also for toplevel problems of cognition.154
These are the problems that define corporate strategy and tactics.
They include everything from deciding among potential new
products to building new factories to forecasting demand to
setting prices to contemplating mergers. Today, in most
corporations, the answers to these problems are ultimately
decided by one man: the CEO. Yet they are the problems that . .
. are probably most amenable to collective decision making,
even if the collective is a relatively small group.155
Surowiecki goes on to promote the use of “methods of aggregating collective
wisdom” in making strategic decisions.156 In an age which saw the sharp rise
and swifter fall of Enron, the allegedly “smartest guys in the room,”157 the
luster of professional expertise in strategic decisionmaking has lost some of its
shine.158 In its place, the use of collective intelligence, through such
mechanisms as organizational structure, referenda, and information markets,
has enjoyed a recent surge in interest and popularity.159 Similarly, the wisdom
152
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of the average employees has been (again) heralded in recent popular business
literature.160
Of course, employees may be wrong. But if a majority of employees
vote “no” based on business-judgment concerns, then at least management has
an awareness of the problem and the opportunity to respond to those concerns.
A more vigorous debate of the wisdom of the merger increases the likelihood
that the eventual decision will be the most efficient one.
2. Employee-Related Concerns. The vote might also reflect employeespecific concerns about the proposed transaction. For example, employees
might vote for a merger because the merger will offer greater opportunities for
employees to move up in the organization. Conversely, employees might vote
against a combination because of proposed layoffs or closings that the
combination would engender. Unlike business judgment concerns, employeespecific concerns specifically relate to the employee’s interests and may be
counter to the interests of managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders in the
firm.
A “no” vote from a majority of employees may signal specific
employee-related concerns about the proposed transaction. Most obviously,
employees may be concerned about lay-offs or terminations that would result
from post-combination redundancies. In fact, the very reason for the deal may
be the cost savings from a reduced payroll. Employee rejection of such a deal
would be unsurprising and perhaps not all that illuminating to decisionmakers
within the firm.
However, for those who believe in a stakeholder or “mediating
hierarchy” theory of board governance, an employee referendum offers a way
to quantify the breadth of employee sentiment for and against a proposed
transaction. As discussed earlier,161 stakeholder theorists believe that the role
of the board is to balance between the concerns of the various stakeholders in
the firm. Unlike shareholder primacists, who believe that directors must
maximize residual returns to shareholders, stakeholder theorists argue that
boards must generally maximize returns across all of the stakeholders to the
firm.

Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, Working Paper, available at:
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1141 (2006).
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Scholars disagree whether existing corporate law is more oriented
toward shareholder primacy or stakeholder theory.162 One clear example of
stakeholder theory in action, however, is the state corporate constituency
statute. Over half of the states163 have a provision allowing directors to make
certain decisions based on the needs of all corporate constituencies. New York,
for example, provides that when considering a change or potential change in the
control of the corporation, a director “shall be entitled to consider” the effects
that the corporation's actions may have upon the corporation’s various
stakeholders, including current employees, retired employees, customers,
creditors, and the communities in which it does business.164 The purpose of the
statute is to give directors the freedom to consider the impact of a control
transaction165 on stakeholders other than shareholders. Constituency statutes
have generated a voluminous literature both in favor and against such
statutes.166
The most generally recognized weakness of the constituency statute is
the lack of accountability for its use. Directors are only given authorization to
consider the needs of other constituencies; they are not obligated to do so.167
Directors are not legally accountable to any of the stakeholders for failure to
consider their needs.168 Thus, critics fear that constituency statutes will be used
162
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as a “fig leaf” by boards to act in their own interests, rather than in
stakeholders’ interests.169 Despite numerous proposals to beef up constituency
statutes,170 they remain in their largely hortatory form.
Employee referenda are a way of putting more substance into
constituency statutes. In their current form, directors could cite to vague or
anecdotal employee concerns in order to approve, nix or counter a proposed
corporate combination. With an employee referendum in place, directors
would have a concrete representation of employee sentiment upon which to
base their actions, at least for that constituency. The information generated in
response to the referendum would also be useful to directors in formulating
their constituency-balancing. By providing quantitative evidence about
employee views, the referendum would provide a better foundation for director
decisions based on the stakeholder framework.
It is true that constituency statutes were created to allow boards to fight
hostile takeovers, and such takeovers do not generally involve shareholder
votes. Instead, the hostile bidder makes a tender offer for the company which
the target board may then try to defeat. However, such statutes apply to any
change of control situation, which may include a company being taken over by
another pursuant to a merger or sale of substantially all assets. A board could
use the employee referendum to shut down or back out of a deal that employees
disliked. And it could do so based simply on employee-related concerns.171
More generally, the employee referendum supports the stakeholder
model by looking for input from stakeholders other than shareholders on
critical decisions of corporate strategy. Employees would have the opportunity
169

Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, to Mario
Cuomo, Governor for New York (June 6, 1989), cited in Mitchell, Framework, supra note LM2,
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to voice their own, potentially self-interested concerns, and directors could take
those concerns into account. The referendum invigorates the stakeholder model
by offering a concrete way for employees to reach the board with their input.
Under stakeholder theory, directors are obliged to take this input seriously;
directors could even incorporate the referendum into the process of the
transaction itself.172 Thus, even where employees simply vote based on their
own interests, the employee referendum would be useful to corporate
decisionmakers.173
3. Managerial Opportunism Concerns. Thirdly, a vote might reflect
employee concerns related to management and managerial opportunism. Even
if the combination makes sense from a business judgment perspective,
employees might still vote against the merger if they believe management has
used the transaction as an opportunity to extract unnecessary rents from the
firm.
As discussed earlier,174 corporate combinations offer management the
opportunity to extract particularized rents. Because the combination requires
some degree of reshuffling, both of the corporate structure and the managerial
hierarchy, the combination will generally require changes in managerial
positions as well as compensation. The combination is often an opportunity for
management to give itself bonuses for pulling off the merger. If the new
corporation must offer new stock, performance-related pay packages will be
restructured to accommodate the new system. These new packages often
provide benefits to managers, such as accelerated vesting of stock options, new
options packages, or new grants of stock or restricted stock.175 Even base pay
may be changed to reflect the new corporate culture of the combined entity.
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While directors may be expected to police instances of excessive
compensation, there are a variety of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First,
the directors themselves may be in on the deal. Just as managerial reshuffling
can lead to payouts, so too directorial reshuffling. The firm may decide to
award bonuses to directors as well as managers.176 Second, directors may
already feel beholden to managers. Top-level executives have significant
power over the board nomination and reelection process177 as well as the
directorial compensation process.178 Personal ties help cement the feelings of
loyalty and friendship.179 Third, the merger process is so complicated and
hurried that directors may focus on the big picture and neglect to work through
the complicated compensation details. As discussed, managers generally turn
to the board for approval of these transactions at the last minute. As they
generally do, boards may trust that investment bankers, compensation
consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the compensation issue
sufficiently.180
In the context of a merger or acquisition, shareholders are empowered
to protect against such compensation themselves by vetoing the proposed
combination. However, shareholders have to know about the problem in order
to police it. Increasingly, shareholder service providers are taking steps to
police management and inform large institutional shareholders about problems
or corruption.181 But such services are not complete. We are still far from a
world in which shareholders are completely informed about their firms and
have the power and incentives to act on that information.182
176
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Employees are ideally situated to ally with shareholders in an effort to
police management. Indeed, this appears to be already taking place. Labor
unions, for example, have become much more involved in traditional corporate
governance activism.183 In the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to
shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency
statutes.184 However, unions have increasingly joined the side of shareholders
in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate governance measures.185
Unions and union-affiliated pension funds have promoted anti-takeover
measures through shareholder proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8.186 “The
amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals,” notes one
set of commentators, “is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any
institutional investor.”187
There is thus a new role for union activism: an alliance with
shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term growth for shareholders and
other stakeholders.188
In particular, unions can use their “monitoring
advantages to take actions to increase firm value by policing management
shirking and reducing the agency costs of equity.”189 In addition, unions have a
greater incentive to monitor management, because “[w]orkers are locked into
the firm with firm-specific capital investments.”190 If unions can monitor and
credibly relay their information to other shareholders, their role in current
corporate governance processes will only expand.191
However, the overwhelming majority of employees do not have union
representation.192 For them there is no institution to play the role that unions
play in receiving and channeling employee information. The referendum would
provide employees with the opportunity to express themselves collectively on
an issue of corporate governance. The referendum results, along with the
information generated by those results, would play a similar role in informing
shareholders and board members about collective employees concerns. And
183
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employees would have the incentive and the ability to express concerns about
managerial overreaching.
The referenda thus offer the opportunity for employees to join with
shareholders in policing management opportunism.
Unlike directors,
employees do not have the complications that can often muffle complaints
about executive overreaching.193 And unlike shareholders, employees are
immersed in the firm and are more likely to know about managerial
misconduct. Employees could vote against a transaction on the grounds that
the compensation packages for managers were too rich and undeserved.
Although this signal would have no binding ramifications, it would highlight a
problem that shareholders could address in their binding vote on the matter.
In addition, employees themselves may have ownership interests in the
company. An employee may be invested in her company in a variety of forms.
The employee might buy stock independently. A more common scenario
involves employee purchases of company stock through a 401(k) plan. Recent
reports suggest that thirty to forty percent of the assets of 401(k) plans that offer
an employer stock fund are invested in that fund.194 In fact, lower-wage
workers are more likely to be heavily invested in their company’s stock.195 But
employees may also have ownership interests that do not provide the traditional
shareholders’ rights. Stock options provide another way for employees to have
ownership in the company but do not provide a right to vote. The purpose of
the stock option is to encourage employees to think like owners.196 Millions of
employees receive stock options and thus have similar incentives to
shareholders without a vote on corporate combinations.197
The employee referendum thus gives more power to the shareholders
by increasing the odds that they can use their vote as an effective curb against
managerial opportunism. Shareholder proponents have lamented the weakness
193
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of shareholder protections.198 A non-binding employee referendum gives
shareholders the benefits of employee information with essentially no strings
attached. Shareholders may accept or reject employees’ judgments depending
on their own independent analysis. But shareholders will benefit from the
additional set of monitors that the referendum puts in place when it comes to
corporate combinations. These monitors will have an incentive to work with
shareholders, since they have no power acting on their own. And they have
common ground: the desire to prevent managerial overreaching. Indeed, this
concern may explain why firms have not voluntarily conducted referenda in the
past: managers may have been afraid of precisely this result.
If employees vote against a merger because of a particular concern
about management, managers have the opportunity to correct this problem
before shareholders vote on the transaction. This happens from time to time
without the referenda; for example, in the merger between the MONY Group
and AXA Financial, MONY postponed a shareholder vote and cut $7.4 million
out of executive pay packages in response to shareholder concerns about
excessive compensation.199 But with employees on the scene and able to
express themselves, there is a greater chance that managerial opportunism will
be caught and brought to the attention of shareholders. Knowing this,
management will be more likely to curb opportunism, both ex ante before the
referendum and ex post between the referendum and the shareholders’ vote.
The employee referendum could be just one part of the new coalition
between shareholders and employees to discipline top-level management.
Regardless, the referendum provides shareholders with a way to tap into inside
knowledge for their own benefit. This change will strengthen the use of the
shareholder franchise.200 For this reason, assuming the referenda costs are
low,201 shareholder primacists should welcome the addition of the non-binding
employee referendum to the corporate law framework.
III. REFERENDUM AS VOICE
The employee referendum is a way for employees to communicate their
opinions about the wisdom of a proposed corporate combination. This
communication is beneficial not merely for its instrumentality in increasing in
198
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the flow of information about the transaction. These referenda would also give
employees a chance to voice their concerns in a systematic and public manner.
The vote itself – the chance to be heard – has important benefits beyond the
derivative information gains.
This section discusses the benefits of giving employees a voice in the
corporate transaction. It starts with the basic sense of satisfaction and utility
that employees will derive from the vote itself. It then discusses the
improvements in employee performance and compliance with institutional
norms that come from the chance to participate. Finally, the section discusses
how improving the civic life of the firm may lead to improved civic life in
society more generally.
A. Employee Satisfaction
In their landmark study of the state of employee perceptions, Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers undertook “the most extensive analysis of American
worker attitudes toward workplace relationships and power in more than twenty
years.”202 Using focus groups and telephone surveys of over 2400 employees,
the Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) sought to get an
unbiased look into the concerns of American workers.203 The stakes were
sufficiently high that management and labor groups fought over the framing of
the study and its results.204
According to the WRPS, workers had one primary concern at the
workplace: a desire for more voice. As Freeman and Rogers summarized,
“American workers want more of a say/influence/representation/participation/voice (call it what you will) at the workplace than they now have.”205 The
study found that employees wanted greater participation because of the
improvement to their own working lives as well as the improvement to the
productivity and success of their company.206 They wanted not only voice as
individuals, but collectively as well – particularly on issues that affected the
workers as a group.207 Workers wanted their participation to be cooperative
with management, and believed that management resistance was the primary
reason they did not have more voice within the firm at present.208
Although the WRPS focused on workers’ involvement in employeerelated issues, it found evidence that workers wanted a voice in higher-level
company concerns, as well. The study found that over half of the workers
surveyed worked at a company that had a program for employee involvement,
202
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and thirty-one percent of employees participated in these programs.209 A
substantial number of these employees reported that their employeeinvolvement committees discussed issues of corporate direction.210 Overall,
however, eighty-two percent of employees who participated in employeeinvolvement programs believed that giving employees a greater say in these
programs would make them work better.211 This is consistent with the WRPS’s
findings that workers want more of a voice.
The notion that employees want more of a voice is consistent with a
growing number of findings relating to overall satisfaction in a variety of
circumstances. These findings show that humans want more than simply a
satisfactory outcome; they also place great importance on a satisfactory process.
The “procedural justice” school of social psychology has emphasized the
importance of process to individual satisfaction and utility.212 According to
research, individuals look to a number of factors in determining whether a
decisionmaking process is procedurally just. The decisionmaker’s impartiality,
honesty, and ethicality are critical components, as are the opportunity to appeal
and the quality of the decision. But another critical component is voice: more
specifically, some role for being represented within the decisionmaking
process. Indeed, the importance of voice is evidenced by “one of the most
reliable findings in research on procedural justice: that people react more
favorably to procedures that give them considerable freedom in communicating
their views and arguments.”213
The employee referendum is an opportunity for employees to
participate in the process of corporate combinations. As currently constructed,
this process affords no room for employee voice. The ball passes from top209
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level management to the board to the shareholders without any formal method
for employees to express their opinions. At best, employees may voice their
opinions to each other, to their supervisors, or to the media. But such
opportunities are interstitial, sporadic, and uncertain. Moreover, they offer no
collective opportunity for employees to exercise judgment on the proposed
transaction. By denying employees a voice in the process, corporations and
corporate law reduce employee satisfaction with the outcome, regardless of its
distributive favorability.
Early procedural justice theorists argued that voice and representation
were important for the effect these had on the ultimate outcome of the
procedures.214 Participation in the process was not important in and of itself,
but rather for its instrumental effects. This theory, known as the “control
model,” had significant effects on the development of procedural justice
scholarship.215 However, a growing body of literature suggests that voice is not
solely important for its effect on the process. Rather, voice is a noninstrumental value. This alternative approach, known as the “group-value”
model, argues that expression of one’s view is important without reference to
the impact on the outcome.216 Instead, “[t]he opportunity to present one’s
views enhances procedural justice judgments in and of itself.”217 These
findings confirm what is probably intuitive: we appreciate the opportunity to
make ourselves heard during decisionmaking processes simply for that
opportunity.
These findings have important ramifications for the notion of a nonbinding employee referendum. One criticism of the proposal would be that
employees will not care about the opportunity simply to express themselves.
Because management and shareholders are free to ignore the employees’ vote,
the vote may seem meaningless and trivial. But procedural justice findings
indicate that the vote will have value just as an opportunity for employees to
express their views. “Communicating their views and arguments” is itself a
benefit.218
In researching the reasons why voice is a non-instrumental value, social
psychologists have found that the opportunity to participate has important
ramifications for a group’s self-valuation. This model, known as the relational
model of authority, finds that “people are concerned with those aspects of
214
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procedures that convey information to them about their status in their group.”219
A just process communicates to those involved that they have importance and
worth to the decisionmakers. In a study of 404 employees from a variety of
employment settings,220 Tom Tyler and Steven Blader found strong support for
the relational model of authority. Overall the study found that employees
concerns about procedural justice exceeded their concerns about distributive
justice and outcome favorability.221 Looking at what employees found most
important in assessing the fairness of their workplaces, Tyler and Blader found
that concerns relating to status recognition and neutrality were significantly
more important than their ability to exercise control over their workplace or the
likelihood of favorable outcomes.222 To the employees in the study,
conceptions of fairness were based more on the relational norms evidenced by
certain procedures, and less on their power to take part in the actual
decisionmaking.
These findings suggest that the employee referendum will provide
employees greater satisfaction by providing employees with a higher level of
recognition and status. Having a formalized role in the process demonstrates
that employees are valued members of the community entitled to participate.
Even if they have no control over the process, and even if the end result is a
combination that is disadvantageous to workers, having a role in the process
will provide employees with a greater sense of fairness and greater satisfaction
with their workplace. Combined with the informational benefits that the
referenda provide to shareholders and directors, the referenda proposal is a winwin-win for all three of the primary groups involved.
Of course, it may seem unsettling that employees could be satisfied
with a largely symbolic role, rather than actual decisionmaking power. In fact,
the larger notion that people care more about looking important rather than
being important suggests the possibility for manipulation or fraud. Procedural
justice theorists have described this phenomenon as the “false consciousness
problem.”223 In one study, for example, an opportunity to voice one’s opinion
about a decisionmaker’s verdict led to an increase in the perception of fairness
219
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even when there was no chance of even influencing the decision.224 The
authors noted that this could lead people to believe that the process was fair
“even though, by objective criteria, it is patently unfair.”225 An employee
referendum could fool employees into thinking that their votes mattered when,
in actuality, they did not. Given employees’ propensity to overestimate the
power of their legal rights,226 the referendum may be a tool of keeping
employees in the dark while extracting valuable information and postcombination acquiescence.
This is an overreaction. Employees should know full well that the vote
is not binding on the company, and it would not be in management’s interest to
encourage such a belief. After all, if the referenda defeats the combination but
it goes through anyway, the legal reality will hit home. To the extent that
management pretends to be interested in the referenda but does not really care,
that expression of concern may be valuable in and of itself to employees. Even
if it is merely symbolic, an expression of employees’ importance to the firm is
useful and meaningful. Ultimately, a symbolic expression not only has its own
meaning, but over time can deepen into a stronger current between management
and employees. By establishing a mandatory procedure, the referendum
proposal provides employees with a voice in the process that upgrades their
status within the group. This increase in the procedural justice of the workplace
not only improves the lot of workers, but also has further benefits for the firm
and society.
B. Employee Performance and Compliance
Providing employees with a voice in the corporate combination process
would give them a greater sense of fairness and procedural justice with regards
to that process. Such a sense is a value in and of itself. But workers who
perceive their workplaces are more procedurally just are more likely to work
cooperatively, follow the firm’s leadership, and comply with ethical guidelines.
Getting employees to work cooperatively – that is, to work together for
the good of the company – is an essential component to successful business.
As self-interested actors, individuals will generally place their own needs above
the needs of others. But in working for a firm, individuals are asked to engage
224
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in joint productive activity, in which the gains may not be easily partitionable
between members. The notion that firm members must provide individualized
investments in exchange for uncertain and nonseparable returns has been
referred to as the “team production” problem.227 Although corporate law
scholars have focused on agency cost theory in discussing the purpose of the
firm, some theorists consider the puzzle of team production to be more
important in explaining the law’s function.228
Recent scholarship has focused more specifically on the role of law in
fostering or impeding the development of cooperative relationships within the
firm. The need to develop cooperative behavior through trust may explain such
corporate law doctrines as the duty of care in the face of the business judgment
rule, the mandatory nature of the duty of loyalty, and problems with closelyheld corporations.229 But trust may be highly dependent on the social
context.230 Certain seemingly irrelevant provisions, such as the duty of care,
can have important representational and relational power in fostering trust
amongst members of the corporation. Scholars have argued that failure to take
trust into account can have deleterious consequences to a firm or to society as
whole.231 Such observations are backed up by extensive social science findings
about the importance of group cooperation.232
Perceptions that a process or institution is procedurally just have been
shown to lead to increased cooperative behavior.233 In their study of
employees, Tyler and Blader found that procedural justice assessments were
more likely to predict discretionary cooperative group behavior, such as
complying with work rules and norms, exerting full effort to get the job done,
deferring to organizational authority, and going beyond job responsibilities to
help others at the job, than were the employees’ perceptions of distributive
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justice or outcome favorability.234 Research has also linked perceptions of
procedural justice with other attitudes and behavior that are supportive and
beneficial to the firm as a whole. Individuals are less likely to leave a group
and are more committed to their group or organization when they perceive the
group to be procedurally just.235 They are more likely to perceive the institution
as acting legitimately.236 Ultimately, a whole host of behaviors beneficial to the
firm correspond to the procedural justice of the firm. As Tyler and Blader note:
These results suggest that we know a considerable amount about
how to encourage the types of cooperative behavior that are
central to the effectiveness of groups. We can do so by creating
structures that enact decision-making processes in ways that
group members will experience as fair.237
Happiness with the fairness of the process leads to happiness with the
outcome itself, which leads to greater acceptance of the outcome. One of the
most robust findings about procedural justice is that individuals are more likely
to comply with those outcomes, both in experimental and in real world settings,
that they perceive as procedurally just.238 Procedural justice judgments have
been found to be particularly important to adherence to an agreement over
time.239 Much of this research has focused on responses to judicial or other
dispute resolution procedures, but it applies as well in the context of group
decisionmaking.
This research supports a common sense notion: workers are likely to do
a better job if they believe their workplace treats them fairly and wants their
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input.240 As discussed above, these results do not ride in ultimate control over
the actual outcomes, or even the value of those outcomes. An employee
referendum would provide employees with a way of participating in the
transforming transaction. As a result, it will lead to better cooperation and
compliance within the workplace.241
C. Social Capital
In her recent book Working Together, Cynthia Estlund discusses the
importance of workplace interaction to democratic life in a civil society.242 In
her view, the workplace is “the single most important site of both cooperative
interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the family.”243 The
focus of Estlund’s book is the workplace’s role in creating bonds between
individuals from different racial, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as
between men and women. But her insights on the role of the workplace as an
institution for civic life have important ramifications for this article’s
referendum proposal.
Estlund argues that the workplace is a critical institution for the
reinvigoration of civic life. Citing the recent literature on “social capital,”244
Estlund demonstrates that social capital is “linked to an array of social goods,
including greater prosperity, health and well-being, safe neighborhood, and
better government.”245 She argues, however, that social capital theorists have
lamented the decline of civic institutions while overlooking the role of the
240
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workplace in fostering greater social capital. In Estlund’s view, “the workplace
[is] a central site of social capital building in contemporary society.”246
If Estlund is correct, then the employee referendum could be an
important way of encouraging and developing social capital amongst
employees. As discussed above, employee referenda would foster a climate of
greater procedural justice, leading to greater cooperation and trust within the
firm. In essence, greater procedural justice has been shown to lead to greater
social capital within the firm. In addition, part of social capital is so-called
“civic skills” – “skills of communication, compromise, and collective
decisionmaking, and a sense of political efficacy.”247 As an exercise in
corporate democracy, the referendum would facilitate the development of these
skills. Estlund makes an eloquent plea for the importance of workplace
discussions to the realm of public discourse.248 Arguing that the workplace is
“a leading site of public discourse,” Estlund describes how at the workplace,
employees practice their deliberation skills, discuss topics of national
importance, and reach across family and neighborhood boundaries.249 The
employee referendum would facilitate all of these, in a forum that allows for
direct participation on an issue of importance to the entire workforce.
Moreover, the employee referendum would mitigate some of the
concerns that social theorists have about the workplace as an institution of civic
life. For example, theorists are concerned with the instrumental and
hierarchical context in which managers can rule the workplace.250 Estlund
herself recognizes that “[t]o the extent that the workplace is a major site for the
formation of social capital, it contributes very unequal portions of those assets
to individuals and groups at different rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.”251
She counters: “These concerns are mitigated but not dissolved by trend towards
greater collaboration and less rigid hierarchies in the workplace.”252 The
referendum is an opportunity for collaboration and equality: all get to vote, and
each vote has the same weight. It would thus mirror the democratic institutions
that social theorists are hoping to nuture.
There is another way in which benefits from employee referenda may
spill out beyond the firm and into the public at large. These referenda may
serve to reinvigorate the discussion about possible new channels for employee-
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firm relations across society.253 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when states
were passing corporate “constituency” statutes, some believed that the statutes
were important simply for their symbolic value.254 As one commentator
argued:
. . . [T]he fact that half of the states have enacted legislation that
recognizes that employees are stakeholders in their firms is an
important event, if only for its symbolic value. The very
enactment of such statutes suggests that employees' interests are
beginning to receive serious attention in the public mind. It
therefore suggests the possibility that effective means of
protecting them can be developed in the future.255
As I have argued above, I believe that employee referenda would have
substantial informational and participatory benefits to employees. But they
would also have a symbolic meaning to the public at large: employees matter.
The referendum is not intended to be a “camel’s nose under the tent” leading to
a binding employee referendum down the road. But it is supposed to be one
piece of a new approach to employer-employee relations that will recast those
relations for a new century. The referendum proposal may stimulate other ways
in which relations between managers, directors, shareholder and employees can
be restructured for the greater fairness and efficiency of corporate law and
society as a whole.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Parts II and III of this paper discuss the benefits in implementing a
system of non-binding employee referenda for corporate combinations. This
part concerns the costs of implementation. There are a myriad of ways of
setting up a system of referenda. But such a system will inevitably impose
some costs on businesses. Employees must register their votes, and then the
firm must tabulate and announce the results. These processes take employee
time and firm resources. These costs must be weighed against the benefits in
deciding the wisdom of implementing the plan. Below are some initial
thoughts on how the referenda could be constructed to keep costs as low as
possible while still retaining the key elements.
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A. Bright Line Rules
In order to keep the process as straightforward as possible, the
legislation should be crafted to match up with bright-line rules that firms could
easily follow in holding the referenda. First, the definition of “employee” is a
source of some controversy, as temporary employees, employees of
subcontractors, and independent contractors all may be considered “employees”
depending on the statute or state common law in question.256 In order to ease
administration, firms should count as employees those workers whom they
count as employees for tax purposes.257 Both the company and the IRS are
likely to keep accurate and up-to-date records of a company’s employees.
Introducing a different standard is likely to cause further confusion and delay.
In addition, states should set a flexible but easy to calculate timeline for
holding the vote. There must be enough time after the announcement for
employees to process and share information about the transaction, but it must
be sufficiently before the shareholder vote to allow for shareholders and
directors to respond to the results.258 Perhaps the proposal could require that
the referenda not be held less than thirty days after the announcement, but its
results must be announced at least thirty days prior to the shareholder’s vote. If
the latter requirement were not followed, shareholders would have the right to
petition a court for a delay in the vote in order to meet the thirty-day period.259
B. Distribution and Election Costs
Beyond these bright line rules, companies should have considerable
flexibility in establishing the process through which employees would vote.
This flexibility will enable companies to experiment with the process and
develop the most cost effective means of processing the votes.
The cost of running an employee referendum might initially seem
comparable with the costs of conducting elections over shareholder proposals,
which have been estimated at $87,000 per proposal.260 However, $37,000 is
256
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estimated as expense for deciding whether to include the proposal or not.261 As
for the $50,000 in printing, distribution, and tabulation costs, those costs would
be substantially smaller for an employee referendum. Because the company
has a direct connection to its employees, it can use interoffice to distribute the
materials; in the alternative, materials may be distributed electronically for
more savings. Similarly, the vote need not be conducted at polling stations
with paper ballots during work hours; instead, the company could use a website
to collect and tally the votes. As Internet access continues to grow and expand
across the population, the ability to coordinate the distribution of information
together with the actual voting will mean fairly low costs for conducting the
employee referendum online.262
C. State Law Enactment
Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of our
state, as opposed to federal, system of corporate law.263 Because mergers and
acquisitions are controlled by state law, the employee referendum makes sense
as a creature of state law. It is designed to work within that system and be a
part of the corporate combination process. Although it may, perhaps, be
possible for such a requirement to be imposed through federal law,264 it would
shareholder proposals could save companies over a billion dollars. Roberta Romano, Less is
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,
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be an overlay on top of a distinct legal regime. And it would be subject to
criticism as a federal intrusion upon state practices of corporate governance.
Implementing the referenda through state law has functional
advantages as well. Since the referenda has not been tried anywhere, it is by its
very nature an experimental project. In Justice Brandeis’s memorable phrase,
states serve as “laboratories” of democracy and “try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”265 This notion has come to
life in corporate law.266 States could implement the referenda in a variety of
different ways and determine, by looking at others, which practices work
best.267
CONCLUSION
In closing, let us revisit the opening quote from the email by Robert
Hughes to Gerald Levin. In retrospect, the email may be spiteful and
vindictive, but it is also well-founded. The merger with AOL was indeed
disastrous.268 But the email was written not in January 2000, or even January
2001, but in 2002, well after the initial hopes of the merger had been shown to
be unfounded. With the benefit of hindsight, Hughes can declaim against the
combination with effective bitterness. But what did he think in 2000?
This “what-if” demonstrates the possibilities for the employee
referendum. If employees, along with the shareholders, had overwhelmingly
approved the merger, then it would be much harder for Hughes and those like
him to center their anger on the CEO. Instead of feeling justly vengeful,
Hughes might have to look inward, first, to see how he and his fellow
employees voted. Given the apparent stock price boost that the merger seemed
to have in store for Time Warner shareholders, employees might have voted for
given great deference in establishing their own systems of corporate governance. See Santa Fe v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977). Given that the vote would be part of the state’s scheme of
corporate law, state corporate law interests should outweigh any potential overlap the referendum
has with NLRB processes.
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the merger to support their 401(k) and stock option plans. Having bought into
the merger from the beginning, perhaps they would have given less resistance
to it and would have made the transition smoother and ultimately more
successful.
Or perhaps employees would have voted against the merger. After-thefact accounts bristle with Time Warner employees who were horrified at the
merger and never thought it would work.269 If they truly were against the
merger from the start, employees could have put a splash of cold water on a
process that was all heat and light. Directors, shareholders, and the media
would have asked why, and would have found business-judgment concerns,
employee-centered concerns, or concerns about managerial opportunism – or
all three. These doubts might have led to more questions about whether the
proposed combination was as good an idea as was touted. Even if the merger
had gone through, perhaps the company, its shareholders, and the media would
not have been so optimistic about the immediate future, and the subsequent
downturn would have been less crushing. Moreover, having been given a say
in the process, employees may have been more receptive to the combination
and may have worked to make it more successful.
This is speculation. But behind the speculation about this particularly
ill-conceived merger lies the possibility for a different future. Economic,
psychological, and corporate law research suggests that employees may have
the information and the interest in participating formally in their company’s
decisions to combine with another. The employee referendum would be a
straightforward yet significant way of bringing them into the conversation.
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See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 62; SWISHER, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX
Proposed changes to Delaware Law
(Changes to existing statute in bold)

DEL. CODE ANN.
TITLE 8
§ 251. Merger or consolidation of domestic corporations and limited liability
company
...
(new c) At least 30 days after the adoption of the agreement, the
corporation shall hold a non-binding referendum in which all employees
[as defined by state tax law] shall vote on the agreement. The results of
this referendum must be announced publicly at least 30 days prior to the
holding of the special stockholders meeting in subsection (d).

(c) (new d) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of the
time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of stock,
whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at the stockholder's address as
it appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of
the meeting. The notice shall contain a copy of the agreement or a brief
summary thereof, as the directors shall deem advisable. The notice shall
include the results of the employee referendum in subsection (c). At the
meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote taken for its adoption or
rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to
vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be
certified on the agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the
corporation. If the agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each
constituent corporation, it shall then be filed and shall become effective, in
accordance with § 103 of this title.

